Cybersecurity & Information Security

Password Spray Investigation in Active Directory and Entra ID

6 min readPublished: August 5, 2026

Professional visual illustration on Password Spray investigation in Windows and Identity

Quick answer

Password Spray investigation requires reading the full event, not just the Event ID: time, computer, user, Logon ID, Process, network source, and organizational context. The conclusion is formed by correlating several sources.

Windows and Identity investigations rely on a combination of authentication events, process creation, permission changes, Sysmon Telemetry, and organizational context. A single event almost never provides a complete conclusion. This article focuses on Password Spray investigation and is intended for SOC analysts and identity investigators. The goal is to provide a working methodology that can be applied in practice, in a professional interview, and in a work environment, without settling for a dictionary definition.

The main challenge is that data is almost always partial. A few attempts against many users, 4625/SigninLogs, ResultType can indicate a direction, but their meaning depends on the time, asset, user, and expected activity. Therefore, we will build the investigation around an investigative question, required evidence, and clear criteria for completion.

The practical scenario in the article is: building Detection and Timeline from simulated data. All examples are laboratory data or process descriptions. When dealing with Penetration Testing, Web, or Cloud, one must only work with explicit authorization, a defined Scope, and the ability to stop the test.

Password Spray Pattern

The topic 'Password Spray Pattern' is a central part of working on a Password Spray investigation. It is recommended to break it down into three questions: what is the input, what decision do you want to make, and what evidence is sufficient to justify it. These questions prevent automatic tool use without understanding the goal.

In practice, record a few attempts against many users, 4625/SigninLogs, ResultType, IP and User Agent, Success after failures, compare to expected behavior, and define at least one Pivot. The result should be verifiable by another analyst, including limitations and next steps.

Data Sources in AD and Entra

At this stage, we define what evidence is needed to answer the investigative question. For Password Spray investigation, the basic points are Event ID and Provider, Computer, User and Logon ID, Process, Parent and Command Line, Source IP, Workstation, and Logon Type. For each source, document owner, retention period, time zone, ingestion delay, and potentially missing fields.

Collection quality is not measured by whether the log 'arrives'. Completeness, Latency, Parsing, Duplicate events, and time synchronization must be checked. A Canary test or a known lab event allows verifying that the action appeared in the source, passed through the Pipeline, and can be searched in the correct fields.

Grouping by IP and Users

The topic 'Grouping by IP and Users' is a central part of working on a Password Spray investigation. It is recommended to break it down into three questions: what is the input, what decision do you want to make, and what evidence is sufficient to justify it. These questions prevent automatic tool use without understanding the goal.

Checking for Success After Failures

The topic 'Checking for Success After Failures' is a central part of working on a Password Spray investigation. It is recommended to break it down into three questions: what is the input, what decision do you want to make, and what evidence is sufficient to justify it. These questions prevent automatic tool use without understanding the goal.

Containment and Hardening

The response to a Password Spray investigation should mitigate risk without deleting evidence that is still needed. Start with a reversible and focused action, confirm ownership and authority, and document time, action, and result.

Long-term remediation addresses the root cause: permissions, configuration, Validation, Telemetry, process, or training. After implementation, retest and monitor for signs of recurrence, rather than just closing the ticket.

Unique Investigation Focus Areas

In this topic, it is recommended to build a focused evidence map in advance. The central investigation focus areas are: few attempts against many users, 4625/SigninLogs, ResultType, IP and User Agent, Success after failures. The list is not an automatic Checklist; each item is chosen because it can link an entity, action, and time, or explain legitimate behavior.

Few attempts against many users: Define the expected value, what would be considered anomalous, and what additional source would corroborate the finding.
4625/SigninLogs: Define the expected value, what would be considered anomalous, and what additional source would corroborate the finding.
ResultType: Define the expected value, what would be considered anomalous, and what additional source would corroborate the finding.
IP and User Agent: Define the expected value, what would be considered anomalous, and what additional source would corroborate the finding.
Success after failures: Define the expected value, what would be considered anomalous, and what additional source would corroborate the finding.

If one of the focus areas is unavailable, document the gap and choose an alternative. For example, if a Process identifier is unstable, you can use time, Host, User, and Parent; if the Payload is encrypted, use Metadata, volume, frequency, and TLS/DNS context.

Recommended Workflow

Define a Scope and one working question regarding Password Spray investigation.
Record the data sources and required evidence: few attempts against many users, 4625/SigninLogs, ResultType, IP and User Agent.
Create a short Baseline of normal behavior or expected outcome.
Perform the minimal test in a lab environment and save time, input, and output.
Build a Timeline or comparison table and separate fact from interpretation.
Pivot to an additional source to confirm or refute the initial explanation.
Summarize the decision, limitations, recommended action, and Retest criteria.

Practical Scenario

The chosen scenario is building Detection and Timeline from simulated data. The purpose of the exercise is not to prove attack capability, but to practice safe collection, comparison, and documentation. Before starting, define simulated data, time window, and expected outcome.

At the end of the exercise, a deliverable that another analyst or tester can review should be submitted: a screenshot or export of the evidence, a short Timeline, an initial assumption, corroborating evidence, a limitation, and a recommendation. If there is insufficient evidence, the correct conclusion is that the scenario has not been proven.

Stage	What to perform	Deliverable
Preparation	Define Scope, time, and goal. Record which fields or evidence from few attempts against many users, 4625/SigninLogs, ResultType are expected to appear.	Short test plan
Data Creation	Perform a safe and simulated action related to Password Spray investigation, without real information or impact on a production system.	Controlled event/request/flow
Collection	Collect the raw evidence and context from an additional source. Verify Time zone, identifiers, and completeness.	Two linked pieces of evidence
Analysis	Write what each piece of evidence proves, what it doesn't prove, and what the possible legitimate explanation is.	Intermediate conclusion
Completion	Choose closure, escalation, Finding, or Tuning; add a recommendation and Retest.	Documented deliverable

Practical Checklist

Check and document: Event ID and Provider.
Check and document: Computer, User, and Logon ID.
Check and document: Process, Parent, and Command Line.
Check and document: Source IP, Workstation, and Logon Type.
Check and document: Group/Privilege changes.
Check and document: Sysmon ProcessGuid or SessionGuid.
Specify Time zone, tool version, and collection time.
Save raw data before filtering or modifying.
Write what the finding proves and what is still unknown.
Define owner and next action with a due date.

Common Mistakes

Relying on Event ID without fields.
Confusing Logon with the attack source.
Ignoring Logon Type.
Linking Processes by PID only.
Assuming all PowerShell is malicious.
Closing an event without checking the Domain Controller.

Summary and CTA

Password Spray investigation in Active Directory and Entra ID is a topic that connects technical knowledge with work discipline. Start with a question, collect only relevant evidence, maintain context and time, and choose an action that can be justified and re-tested.

In the Cybersecurity & AI track at HPI, these principles are practiced using systems, logs, and labs. A natural next step is to move on to the linked articles, perform the lab exercise, and save the output as part of a professional portfolio.

FAQ

Does Password Spray investigation alone prove an attack or weakness?

No. It provides a signal or finding that requires context, validation, and an additional source. A professional conclusion relies on a sequence of evidence and consistency with expected behavior.

What to do when some data is missing?

Document the missing data, check for an alternative source, and reduce the confidence level. Do not fill in fields by conjecture or present 'Unknown' as normal.

How long should evidence be retained?

The time depends on policy, regulation, cost, and event type. It is important to define Retention, Legal hold, and the ability to export evidence in a verifiable format in advance.

How to practice without endangering a real system?

Use virtual machines, simulated data, CTF, or a dedicated lab. In authorized tests, define Scope, Stop conditions, and backup before starting work.